I had my own grave doubts about the new Aries rocket and its technical soundness. I really was convinced the design was borne out of the lobbying power of the various military/ aerospace contractors that keep the shuttle going. Rather than the right design from a technical standpoint.

Current press is not good with many engineers going public saying that Aries is overrun with technical issues, some of which may be unsolvable.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... nauts.html

I reckon a more technical sound approach would have been to work with the Russians, perhaps use the Energia rocket to place moon transfer stages into orbit. Then use the Shuttle to carry the astronauts to and from Earth Orbit.

I agree with you here, but the big concern is that Ares is attempting to mix outdated technology to new technology. The SRB's are troublesome beats and far past being a prime piece of safe & cost effective propulsion hardware. Perhaps NASA should have backed the new space movement here such as Space X and got a more up to date solution. But alas I feel there was more consideration of political and business concerns in selecting the Ares design.

One can not go past the immense lobbying power of the industrial/ aerospace manufacturing complex in the U.S. The shuttle program employs nearly 7500 Americans, who would all need new jobs if all shuttle hardware was scraped for good. No senator would want that on their heads let me tell you

I get the impression that the problem stems from trying to take too big a leap to the 'next-generation' craft. Ares (and others) are being rushed because the shuttle fleet is aging badly, while the shuttles are being made to run long past their use-by date because the replacements aren't ready and won't be for some time to come.

So what to do?
Well, for all its well-documented failures and shortcommings, the Shuttle is a proven system, that on a launches-per-failure, is as good or better than anything else going around.

We already have existing (and future) SRBs that work.
We already have an updated external tank that works.
We already have all the existing manufacturing and support infrastucture for the shuttle.

Which only leaves the orbiter. Now we know the basic shape of the orbiter works, so leave it alone. That just leaves the internal systems in the orbiter plus the heatshielding.

Wouldn't it be a lot simpler to produce a Mk II orbiter for the shuttle program? The old orbiters could be retired sooner AND the next-gen spacecraft have have the time to really be done properly.

By way of comparasion, the 747 is an even older design. But while the basic design (overall) is still good enough for today, underneath the skin every sub-system has been improved and upgraded, sometimes many times over. Given that 747F air-freighters are the closest thing to orbiters, maybe they could learn a trick or two from them.

I think the primary reason for the Shuttle's retirement is shear cost to operate the thing. The idea behind the initial concept was a totally reusable VTHL orbiter which alas, didn't materialise into reality. Just about every system and subsystem has been upgraded on the entire system since its initial development which includes much of the orbiter itself. Unfortunately, much of the maintenance issues (of which is prohibitive) is related to the reentry protective systems of which there’s no obvious solution to without suffering a massive payload penalty further driving up mission costs per payload mass delivered.
As Jamie mentioned, there’s lots of politics involved and not every decision is based on technical merit, but there’s been at least 3 attempts at developing and operating a shuttle and only the Americans partly succeeded by throwing obscene amounts of green stuff at it.

So how are India's moon mission ambitions progressing ?

I haven't been keeping up to date with how they are going.

Feel free to add the obligatory "Off Planet" call centre jokes...

One of the primary reasons for the retirement of the shuttle is reliability. I noted the following stats in an article just before the Discovery STS-119 mission:
---
NBC Nightly News (3/11, story 5, 1:30, Costello) said "had they gone ahead with the launch tonight, there could have been a very serious mishap on the pad. And it points to the bigger problem with all three remaining shuttles." Former NASA administrator Michael Griffin told NBC in January that "the risk of a shuttle disaster is now about 1 in 80. If the shuttle's life is extended five years, the risk would be 12% per flight, which is why NASA is anxious to retire the shuttle and start flying a new generation of spacecraft modeled off the old Apollo program very quickly. By the way, NASA says it is hoping to try to launch this shuttle again on Sunday."
----

Each component on the shuttle needs to have an extremely long MTBF (mean time between failure) if the shuttle is to have a clean (failure-free) 8.5 minutes flight from launch to orbit. I seem to remember the figure was needed to average over 1,000,000 hours MTBF (not sure on that, I read it a long time ago) just for that launch window, not including the rest of the mission or re-entry.

So it is a combination of financial, engineering, and political pressures contributing to the necessary upgrade.

Interestingly, the latest shuttle mission was used to test tiles to possibly be used on future space vehicles. Additional instrumentation was also added to the SRBs to investigate thrust instabilities and vibration in the boosters. All good info for the Ares booster development.

Hopefully the new Orion mission will go well, and all that has been learned along the way will be applied and make for safer space travel. We don't want any more disasters, it stops them flying for way too long.

The harmonic resonance is something Apollo and the Sat V had to overcome. Since it's a solid grain geometry variations should be able to be worked out. As far as the shuttles, they are at the end of their design life. Unfortunately they are not B-52s and can not be extended for nearly a century.

That being said Aries has problems, unload the dead weight of major contractors looking for a handout and go to the hungry contractors like SpaceX who don't yet have that entitlement attitude. A total redo? Not likely, but the problems can be isolated and the hammerhead contractors replaced.

Too often the bean counters dictate sensible science, they think they are Wall Streetables, able to steal money with no responsibility.

Well, it looks like the lemon is finished.

TP

I think the biggest issue here is politics.

The contracters for nasa get other deals which sum up to almost trillions of doillars in contracts.

If more companies without having to go through millions of dollars just in red tape could be allowed to do space travel I think space will be more of a achievable goal by all.

Governments are stopping the future of space exploration by controling it exclusively and through useless financial contracts.

Nasa puts the price of each KG to go into space at over $48000 at ground level including fuel.

I and so with many others here can do it for about $3000 a KG and thats passing all security and safety guidelines.

Realisticly I believe most governments are fighting commercial and private space exploration.

Let me know what you think.

The airframes basic structure was to fly only 100 times each so think they were looking at new builds shortly.

There are many (within the industry) who generally agree with you and it appears as though the upper brass of the Obama administration is now also convinced.

TP

AIAA Daily Launch 11FEB2010

One Of Last Orion Tests Ends In Failure.
NASASpaceFlight.com (2/11, Bergin) reports, "One of the final tests of the now-cancelled Orion Program has ended in failure, when a parachute drop test of an Orion boilerplate (mock-up shell simulating the completed vehicle) resulted in the near-destruction of the vehicle. It marks what is likely to be a sad end for the vehicle." According to the article, Orion has had a "troubled" history "mainly through no fault of its own. Design changes, demanded by its awkward launch vehicle – Ares I – disrupted any fluidity in Orion's DACs (Design Analysis Cycle)." The article blames Ares for any issues, noting Orion was still "making good progress" towards as 2013 readiness date, and calling it surprising that it was canceled in the NASA budget. The article notes that a recent address to Orion workers by managers "point[s] to finishing their work in style, in order to benefit future programs."

AIAA Daily Launch 2MAR2010

Lockheed Announces New Orion Heat Shield Breakthrough
The Orlando Sentinel (3/2, Block) reports, "The Orion crew capsule as a shining example of new technology development? Well, that's the latest word from Lockheed Martin which on Monday hailed the space capsule's new heat shield as a breakthrough." Cleon Lacefield, Lockheed Martin's Orion program manager, said the new shield, developed with TenCate Advanced Composites, was made 12 months faster than scheduled and $10 million cheaper than anticipated. However, "The problem is that the new heat shield has not officially been accepted yet by NASA." According to the article, "While there is no doubt among engineers and space industry analysts that Orion has developed important new technologies, many see a touch of irony and desperation in the company's use of language about new technology development."

Orion removed from NASA control – MOD positioning for commercial role
March 10th, 2010 by Chris Bergin
Original article here (includes images):
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/03/ ... ommercial/

Text of article here:
NASA managers are pushing through the shutdown of the Constellation Program (CxP) at a pace, with a series of memos showing all the Ares test flights have already been cancelled, along Orion ‘defunded’ and returned to the sole control of contractor Lockheed Martin. Meanwhile, MOD director Paul Hill has written to NASA administrator Charlie Bolden, requesting the Agency promotes MOD to the commercial sector.

Orion, Dragon and PDRing into Transition:

The surprise loss in the Constellation cull was Orion, when it was hoped the vehicle would survive the expected death of the Ares Program by transferring its role to another launch vehicle, such as an EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle).

There remains some hope that lead contractor – Lockheed Martin – may yet be able to modify the work already conducted on Orion into a vehicle of a smaller – taxi-like only – design, one which could become a viable crew transport of choice for a commercial carrier to the International Space Station (ISS).

That “optimization” design option for Orion was confirmed via managerial notes, acquired by L2, as was the departure of NASA’s role in the vehicle – via the removal of support and funding.

“Orion optimization plan review was conducted with CxP. Lockheed-Martin looking at optimized design. Pulled all Orion support out of JSC (Johnson Space Center) and put it all back in Denver (Lockheed Martin HQ),” noted the DA Notes roundup.

“Cx funding is being pulled back that was going to JSC engineering and being sent to Denver to support LM similar facilities/services.”

Although Lockheed Martin – via their partnership with Boeing as the United Launch Alliance (ULA) – should be pleased with the commercially-orientated future that has been proposed for NASA, the company has been lobbying ’strongly’ due the loss of Orion in the FY2011 proposal, to the extent they have backed the Senate Bill “Human Space Flight Capability Assurance and Enhancement Act of 2010″.

NASA managers had also positioned themselves firmly behind Orion in their internal Flexible Path presentation, which was created prior to President Obama’s FY2011 proposal’s publication.

“We accept Orion as the basis for American mission-crew access to LEO, and with block upgrades for orbital lifetime and increased entry energy, for return to Earth from deep-space missions,” NASA managers wrote in the 65 page presentation (available on L2).

See also NASASpaceflight.com’s Flexible Path Review:
Part 1: Battle of the Heavy Lift Launchers – Monster 200mt vehicle noted
Part 2: Manned mission to construct huge GEO and deep space telescopes proposed
Part 3: NASA Flexible Path Evaluation of 2025 human mission to visit an asteriod
Part 4: Taking Aim on Phobos – NASA outline Flexible Path precursor to Man on Mars

Ironically, NASA involvement is continuing on another vehicle, SpaceX’s Dragon capsule, as engineers check the progress of the transport’s Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM) testing and EVA (Spacewalk) capability.

“Engineering is at SpaceX for some CBM tests. Per SpaceX request, (engineers) went to SpaceX to assess Dragon EVA compatibility,” added the notes. “Boeing is seeking support for arc-jet facility for CC Dev (Commercial Crew Space Transportation Development).”

Although NASA managers aren’t technically allowed to stop work on Constellation, at least until the FY2011 budget is approved by lawmakers, the program ‘feels dead’ according to sources within CxP, with hardly any work being conducted, other than closeout PDR (Preliminary Design Review) work.

“Obviously, the cancellation of the Constellation Program was disappointing news to us all. I have added some additional information on some of those activities and some new direction,” noted one CxP manager, during an address to his department’s team members.

That work involves estimating “excessing property we were keeping for Cx. May delay on-site review so may have some time to do property re-assessment,” and a general slowdown of the development schedule.

“Many of you were putting in a lot of extra hours to meet the many demands on your time. Given that we are no longer racing to meet a development schedule (i.e.; metal cutting and code slinging), we can throttle that work to a more reasonable level. The Ares II-X and III-X activity is stood down by direction of the program.

“As always, Shuttle and ISS plan/train/fly work is the number one priority. Beyond that, support the PDR activities where you think you can provide the most value to close out the design and to possible future use of the design. Consult your supervisor when making that trade.”


The PDR process, which is understood to have been all-but completed from a vehicle standpoint, understandably changed its focus from evaluating an architecture that is no longer going to fly, to one where it may provide some value for the proposed forward plan.

“Although we are still formulating a long-term strategy, it is smart at this point to look at how we can best capitalize on our Cx work to meet NASA’s new goals of commercial space access, robotic precursors, heavy lift launcher development, and technology development,” added the memo.

“To that end, we want the PDRs to focus on opening up the design to support these goals. More specifically, that means changing the requirements to create a more flexible and generic capability.”

MOD – Value for Commercial Role:

Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) director Paul Hill has been enduring one of the most undesirable tasks faced by NASA managers of late, that of informing an already upset workforce about the reality of the huge job losses at departments which are heavily involved with human space flight.

Mr Hill has conducted a series of All Hands events at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) – videos available on L2 – which have been based on both the reality of the proposal to end shuttle this year and cancel the follow-on program of Constellation, along with the rallying call to focus on the job at hand with the remaining shuttle missions.

The main problem remains, however, that no one actually knows what the forward plan specifically involves, at least from a milestone standpoint, which in turn has increased the uncertainty and anxiety throughout the workforce.

While much has been said about the additional funds proposed in the FY2011 budget, the focus on reducing costs has been central to managerial thinking at departments such as MOD – even before the proposed culling of funding for human space flight operations by NASA, handing it instead to commercial companies who are also under no obligation to hire the services of MOD staff.

The work in carrying out the ‘reduction in operating cost’ was used by Mr Hill in a letter to General Bolden this week, prefaced as a reaction to indirect comments from the NASA administrator.

“With the things that filter down to the center, and based on some things I’ve either heard you say or that have been attributed to you, I felt compelled to send this to you to ensure you have a good idea of where MOD is today. Consider this the elevator speech I’ll not likely have an opportunity to give you,” Mr Hill wrote in the letter, which was sent to numerous high level managers and acquired by L2.

“The days of hundreds, not thousands, of people in the MCC (Mission Control Center) staffing a flight control team are long gone.

“Today, we operate ISS almost exclusively with a front room team of ~13, and that goes down to ~5 while the crew sleeps and on weekends. During some active phases (rendezvous, EVA, etc) and with folks getting some on-the-job training, we may bump the ISS team up to ~30. By 2013, the full time ISS team will be down to 5-10 regardless of the time frame.

“Shuttle flight control teams run ~30 during more quiescent orbit operations including the back rooms, and around 70-80 during more active phases (ascent, entry, rendezvous, EVA, etc). Early Cx operations for mission-ISS were expected to be staffed by teams in the 30-70 range until docking, with an expectation to make similar reductions after some vehicle flight experience.

“While docked to ISS, we did not plan to have a full time operator dedicated to Orion monitoring. Overall, we have been targeting delivering Cx operations for half the equivalent SSP (Space Shuttle Program) operations.

“In both long duration and short duration flight control, recall that we support 24/7, not just until orbit insertion like many expendable launch teams. When comparing Shuttle operations teams to expendables, like SeaLaunch/Zenit, it is really only comparable if you include the upper stage and spacecraft teams, and extend that to the lengthy on-orbit checkout before a spacecraft is handed over to the normal operations team.”

The letter continued in the same manner, illuminating examples of how streamlined MOD had already become, even prior to the change of direction proposed in the FY2011 budget.

“MOD’s Shuttle efforts (is) at under six percent of today’s total SSP budget. In fact, the MOD portfolio is dominated not by the size of the flight control team, but by mission planning, training and facility support,” Mr Hill continued, citing from an associated presentation sent with the letter.

“As an example, MOD typically has five Shuttle crews and 12 ISS expeditions (14 US, 14 Russian, five other IPs) in flight specific training, and another 14 Ascans in generic training leading up to flight specific training.

“As the last page of the attached file shows, MOD today is already 30 percent smaller supporting both programs than we were in 1991 supporting only Shuttle. In September of this year, we will be down another ~600 (26 percent), meaning this year MOD will be half of our size in 1991, and that presumes we stayed on track for Cx.”

These comments mirrored notes Mr Hill provided during his All Hands meetings, as did the main point of his letter, as he stressed the need for NASA to advertise the value of MOD “outside of the agency” – specifically to the commercial companies set to take over NASA’s role in human space flight.

“As you may recall, there is a definite operations culture associated with MOD that is different than sustaining engineering or other program support functions. Ascent, entry and short-duration operations are even more focused cultures, and that is seen in all aspects of planning, training and flying those phases of flight when compared to the equivalent communities supporting ISS (long duration) operations,” Mr Hill continued.

“In addition to the enormous shifts MOD has already made to how we do this job, our goal is to ensure the agency understands the significant and unique capability represented by that operations culture and the mission assurance value it brings to ascent, entry and short-duration human spaceflight.

“With that, particularly if these operations will now reside exclusively outside of the NASA domain, a strong case could be made that the agency is well served by investing MOD support to the commercial providers as both a way provide real mission assurance and to send that serious message outside the agency.

“That discussion must start with an understanding of today’s MOD, in terms of resources, the operations and continuous improvement cultures and the unique skill base MOD stewards for human spaceflight.”

Unfortunately, General Bolden has already noted that the commercial carriers are under no contractual obligation to hire NASA or MOD contractors – and that he can only “ask” them to look into taking the cream of the current stable of engineers and controllers.

Although it is likely a commercial company would aim to tap into the experience base at MOD, the amount of hirings – especially within a cost-conscious company that prides itself on carrying out operations with only a handful of controllers – is an unknown factor that is unlikely to be clarified until after many of the workforce have already been let go.